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Abstract
Global environmental problems, such as climate change and deforestation, are often
referred to as "global public bads." In this paper, we investigate an international transfer
of factor of production how international transfers of production factors either create or
reduce public bads. We also study how welfare levels are affected when each government
in the transfers adopts a non-cooperative policy to improve environmental quality. There
are various ways to mitigate the negative externalities arising from public bads. Our
study considers two types of policy instruments: environmental conservation and pollution
abatement. In the former, the government restricts the use of resources employed during
production. In the latter, the government produces the goods and services necessary to
mitigate the negative effects induced by public bads. We show that the effects of transfers
on welfare levels and on the amount of global public bads depend on the environmental
policy that the government adopts. The second neutrality theorem by Shibata (2003) is
particularly valid under the environmental conservation policy, while the possibility of the
transfer paradox is not excluded under the pollution abatement policy.
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1 Introduction
Growing concerns over global environmental problems such as climate change and deforesta-
tion has increasingly been brought under scrutiny the way in which developed countries lend
financial assistance to developing countries. Assistance to developing country is intended not
only to improve the welfare of a recipient country but also to reduce global public bads: the
negative externalities that may arise from economic activities such as production or consump-
tion.1
In this paper, we investigate the effects of transfer of factor of production on the total
amount of public bads and the level of welfare when a non-cooperative policy is adopted
in order to improve the environmental conditions. This work considers two types of policy
instruments that governments may adopt in an attempt to solve environmental problems: an
environmental conservation policy and a pollution abatement policy. We show that the effects
of transfers on the welfare and on the amount of global public goods depend on the type of
environmental policy that each government adopts.
In the field of international economics, much of the existing literature focuses on whether
or not international assistance can reduce the amount of public bads and if it may improve
welfare in Pareto’s sense. Chao and Yu (1999) have argued that tied aid to environmental
clean-up can lead to Pareto-improving. Naito (2003) has argued that Pareto-improving is
possible by untied aid if the marginal propensity to consume the polluting good in the donor
country is sufficiently larger than in the recipient country. Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002) have
considered a model in which a recipient country emitting cross-border pollution mitigates the
damage using emission tax and public abatement policies. They have argued that an increase
in the donor’s perceived rate of cross-border pollution in fact reduces emission levels.
Our paper differs from the existing literature in that we consider two types of policy
instruments that may reduce the quantity of public bads. In Naito (2003), the provision of
public goods was not considered. In the sutdies of Chao and Yu (1999) and Hatzipanayotou et
al. (2002), the government can use two policy devices, namely, the emission tax and the public
goods provision, to help abate pollution. We do not consider the effect of the emission tax here.
Instead, we consider two types of policy: environmental conservation and publicly provided
pollution abatement. In the former, the government restricts the use of resources employed
during production: this policy is likely to be adopted in developing countries due to their
lack of technology.2 In the latter, the government produces the goods and services necessary
to mitigate the negative effects incurred by public bads. In many developed countries, the
public sector provides services such as environmental clean-up, and supports R&D activities
to reduce the pollution emission.
Although the analysis mentioned above (e.g. Chao and Yu, 1999; Naito, 2003) suggests
the possibilities of a Pareto-improving transfer, Warr (1983) states that in the context of
the voluntary provision of public goods, the total provision of public goods is independent of
distribution of wealth. Shibata (2003a, 2003b) stresses that most public goods are supplied
to mitigate the negative externalities arising from economic activities such as production
and consumption. In this circumstance, he states that the total provision of public goods is
independent not only of distribution of wealth but also of total quantity of wealth: this is
1For example, see Shibata (2003a), Shitovitz and Spiegel (2003), and Ihori and Shibata (2004).
2For example, in China, the farmland reforestation plan was launched in 1999. It has so far converted
24.3 million hectares of fragile farmland on hillsides into forests (Peoples Daily Online, Oct. 11. 2007.
http://english.people.com.cn).
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sometimes referred to as the second neutrality theorem. Furhermore, Ihori and Shibata (2006)
have illustrated the possibility of immiserizing growth in the presence of a non-contributor.
Ono (1998) has derived conditions under which international income transfer brings the Pareto
improvement in the presence of a non-contributor.
In this paper, we reconsider Shibata’s result (2003a) by developing a model that consists of
two small countries in which two tradable goods are produced using two primary production
factors. In the standard model of the voluntary provision of public goods (e.g. Bergstrom et
al., 1986; Andreoni, 1988), it is assumed that each agent can convert one unit of wealth into a
fixed amount of private goods, and that the marginal cost of public goods provision is constant.
In this senario, the transfer that takes the form of factor of production is indistinguishable from
that which takes the form of the final goods. When we consider the international transfers, it
should be noted that the bulk of foreign assistance is used for the capital formation, as pointed
out by Yano and Nugent (1999). Hence, we concentrate our attention to the transfer that
takes the form of the factor of production in the presence of global public bads. As discussed
in Brakman and van Marrewijk (1998), the international transfer of the factor of production
has a supply effect known as the Rybczynski effect as well as an income effect that appears
in the transfer of final goods.3
In addition, we assume that global public bads have a harmful effect on production:
for example, climate change may seriously affect agricultural production. Takarada (2005)
has developed a model with global public bads that lower productivity in one industry and
analyzes the welfare effects of technology transfer in the other. In this paper, it is assumed
that global public bads have a negative effect on the two private sectors to varying degrees.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, when any government adopts
an environmental conservation policy, Shibata’s second neutrality theorem is valid under
certain conditions. Hence, a Pareto-improving transfer is impossible. Second, as opposed to
environmental conservation policy, the transfers of primary factors of production between the
countries that adopt environmental clean-up policies may be Pareto-improving. At the same
time, we cannot exclude the possibility of a transfer-paradox. Lastly, the transfer of primary
factors of production from a country that adopts an environmental conservation policy to
other countries that adopt environmental clean-up policies may enhance welfare in the terms
of Pareto.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present an extended
version of the Hecksher-Ohlin model with public inputs developed by Abe (1990). Section 3
examines the effects of the transfer of primary factors of production on welfare and the total
amount of public bads. Section 4 is the final section and concludes with remarks.
2 The Model
Our analytical framework is a small country model of international trade with spill-over
public bads in which two countries labeled as A and B produce two tradable private goods.
Each country contains two fixed primary factors of production, labeled as 1 and 2. Factor
endowments in country J are denoted by vJ = [vJ1 , v
J
2 ].
4 The government uses primary factors
3Michael and van Marrewijk (1998), Yano and Nugent (1999), and Schweinberger (2002) have also considered
the effects of foreign aid taking the form of the factor of production.
4To simplify the notation in mathematics, we do not make distinction between vector and scalar variables
in description of the model.
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according to either resource conservation or clean-up policies. Denoting vJP = [vJP1 , v
JP
2 ] as
primary factors available in the private sector, a vector, vJ − vJP , is the primary factor used
in the public sector.
2.1 Private Goods Production
Production technology in each private sector, which is assumed to be a constant return to
scale in primary inputs, is identical across countries. Each private sector minimizes its cost
for given factor prices and global public bads. For the sake of analytical simplicity, we specify
the unit cost function of the i-th private sector in country J=A,B, as ĉi(z,wJ) = ai(z)ci(wJ),
where wJ ≡ [wJ1 , wJ2 ] and z denote the vector of the factor prices in country J and the amount
of the global public bads, respectively. The effect of public bads on the unit cost is represented
by ai(z) > 0, where a0i(z) > 0 and a
00
i (z) ≥ 0 are assumed.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the factor endowments of both countries satisfy
the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Two tradable private goods are produced in both countries.
Let good 1 be the numeraire. If both private goods are produced in country J, the
competitive market ensures that:
a1(z)c
1(wJ) = 1, (1)
and
a2(z)c
2(wJ) = P, (2)
where P denotes the fixed world price of non-numeraire goods. Assuming that the two private
industries have different factor intensities without reversal, we can write the factor price vector
as a function of global public bads and international price.
wJ = wJ (z, P ) . (3)
Since production technology is assumed to be identical across countries, the unit cost also
becomes the same. Thus, the factor price equalization theorem is valid: wA = wB. Hereafter,
in denoting factor prices, we omit the superscript denoting the country.
Differentiating and manipulating (1) and (2), we obtain the effect of global public bads





ε1w1 + (ε1 − ε2)Λ−1c1w2c2
ε2w2 + (ε2 − ε1)Λ−1c2w1c1
¸
, (4)
where ciwj ≡ ∂ci/∂wj and Λ ≡ c1w1c2w2− c1w2c2w1. The sign of Λ reflects the difference in factor
intensity between two private sectors: if the i-th private sector intensively employs the i-th
(j-th) factor, then Λ becomes positive (negative). The elasticity of the negative effects on the






Eq. (4) implies that the price of a production factor which is intensively used in an
industry heavily affected by public bads declines unambiguously. If the global public bads
symmetrically damage the production of the two sectors, ε1 = ε2 = ε, then wz = −(ε/z)w < 0.
In what follows, we assume that the negative effects of the public bads vary only slightly
between the two industries. Accordingly, both factor prices are negatively affected by public
bads.
Assumption 2. An increase in public bads reduces both factor prices.
wz < 0.
For given P , vJP and z, the production of private goods in country J can be characterized






From the properties of the revenue function, RJv = w and R
J
vv = O hold. In addition, the
marginal loss induced by the public bads is represented by RJz = wzv
JP < 0, where the last
inequality follows from Assumption 2.
The revenue function represents disposable income in the private sector. In order to
concentrate our attention on the externality affecting the production, we assume that public
bads do not directly affect household utility. In such a situation, the change in the welfare is
represented by the change in disposable income. The income-expenditure constraint of country
J is represented by EJ(P, uJ)−RJ(P, z, vJP ) = 0, where EJ(P, uJ) denotes the expenditure
function of country J and uJ is the utility of country J . Since we consider only small countries,
the change in the welfare is given by dRJ = EJudu
J .
2.2 Global Public Bads and Government Policy
Global public bads are generated in both countries. Denoting zJ as the net amount of global
public bads generated in country J, the total amount of public bads becomes z = zA + zB.
We assume that the amount of the global public bads generated in each country depends on
the primary factors used in production. For example, primary factors of production employed
during the production emit the pollution, hJ(v), as by-products. We make the following
assumption on the pollution-generating function.
Assumption 3. hJ(vJP ) is identical across the countries and is positively homogeneous and
quasi convex in vJP .
2.2.1 Environmental Conservation
When the government adopts an environmental conservation policy, the amount of the public
bads generated in country J can be written as follows:
zJ = hJ(vJ − vJE), (6)
where vJE is the vector of primary factors to be conserved by the government. Thus, vJP =




(P, hJ(vJ − vJE) + z−J , vJ − vJE
¤
, (7)
where z−J denotes the public bads generated in the country other than J. Once a target level
of public bads in country J, hJ∗, is decided, the government minimizes its cost. The cost








Assuming an interior solution exists, we obtain the first-order condition for cost mini-




= hJ∗, where μ denotes the shadow price of the











hJ ≤ hJ∗, w = w∗, vJE > 0
ª
.
Because of linear homogeneity of S(w,h), we can write this as s[w(z, P )]h. Using homogeneous
function properties we obtain
sw(w)h
J = vJ − vJE, (8)
and wsww = 0. Inserting (8) into (7), the revenue function becomes:
RJ = RJ(P, hJ + z−J , swh
J). (9)
2.2.2 Environmental Clean-up
In the environmental clean-up policy, the government cannot directly control the resources
available in the private sector. Instead of conservation, the government produces public input
to mitigate the negative effects from the public bads. Thus, the net amount of the public
bads induced by country J is
zJ = hJ(vJ)− gJ , (10)
where gJ denotes the public input provided in country J. The public input is produced by the








where vJg denotes the primary factors of production used by the government. From the
property of the unit cost function, demand for the primary factors of production can be
written as vJg = cgwgJ .
When the government produces public input to mitigate the negative effects of the public












Thus far, we have not explicitly described the government’s budget constraints. It is assumed
that the governments, which levy lump-sum taxes on their residents, purchase the factors of
production at market price. The budget constraints of the government can thus be written as
Tax Revenue−wvJE = 0 in the environmental conservation policy and Tax Revenue−cggJ =
0 in the environmental clean-up policy.
In the next section, we consider the effects when the transfer takes the form of the primary
factors of production. It should be noted that the amount of public bads generated in each
country does not change if the transfer takes the form of final goods, since the public bads
affect production but not consumption, and the terms of trade effects do not appear by the
assumption of small country. For example, let us consider an infinitesimal transfer in the form
of consumption goods from country A to B by dT . The welfare effects of the transfer then
becomes EAu du
A = −dT < 0 and EBu duB = dT > 0.
Even if the transfer is made by the income or final goods, considering the primary factors
of production is appropriate in some cases. For example, suppose that the government decides
upon the amount of resources to be used in the public sector before those of the production in
the private sector. In this case, the government determines the primary factors of production
that are available in the private sector.
3 Non-Cooperative Policy Equilibrium and Transfer of Pri-
mary Factors
3.1 Environmental Conservation Policy
In this subsection, we consider a situation in which both governments can choose the primary
factors of production to be conserved. In it, the revenue function is specified by (9) for J=A
and B.
Each government maximizes the net income under the Nash conjecture. Noting that





v sw = 0. (12)
In (12), the first term of RHS represents the marginal damage resulting from global public
bads. The second term is a marginal benefit obtained by allowing for additional public bads.
The second-order condition can be written as follows:
∆hJ ≡ RJzz + 2RJzvsw +RJzvswwwzhJ < 0. (13)
From the first-order condition, we obtain the optimal response function as φhJ = φhJ(z−J , P ).




= −1 + wzsw
∆hJ
. (14)






< 1. From Assumption 2 and the second-order
condition, it can be seen that φhJI > −1 but its sign is ambiguous. For example, if the damages








1− γ − ε ,
where γ ≡ ε0z/ε denotes the elasticity of ε with respect to the public bads.5 Noting that the
second-order condition implies 1− γ − ε < 0, we obtain φhJI R 0⇔ γ Q 1.
From the revenue function, (9), it can be easily seen that the level of resource conservation
is independent of the factor endowments. In addition, the factor prices are independent of the
factor endowments. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Supposing that the two countries adopt a resource conservation policy as a
strategic instrument, and that both countries contribute to resource conservation, each coun-
try’s welfare and the total amount of the public bads are independent of the factor endowments.
Proposition 1 states that Shibata’s second neutrality theorem is valid if both governments
adopt the resource conservation policy. The reasoning behind this result is straightforward.
Under the conservation policy, since the government can directly control the primary factors
used in production, the primary factors available in the private sector, vJP , do not change as
long as the initial level of hJ is an optimum in the sense that (12) is fulfilled.6
Proposition 1 is still valid even if there are differences in the emission functions between
the two countries.7 On the other hand, as previously considered in Ihori and Shibata (2004),
the second neutrality theorem as well as the Warr’s theorem does not hold. The theorem also
may not hold when the government adopts policies other than conservation.
3.2 Environmental Clean-up Policy
In this subsection, we assume that the government can only choose the level of public inputs.
In this situation, the revenue function can be written as (11) for A, B. Noting that Rvc
g
w = cg,
we obtain the first-order condition for maximizing the revenue:
∂RJ
∂gJ
= −RJz − cg = 0. (15)
The second-order condition can be written as follows:
∆gJ ≡ RJzz + 2wzcgw − wzcgwwwzgJ < 0. (16)
From the first-order condition, the optimal response function can be written as φgJ =
φgJ
¡
z−J , vJ , P
¢















< 1 is needed. Under the environmental clean-up
policy, the changes in the factor endowments affect the provision of public inputs.
5See Appendix 5.4.
6The specification of (6) may be restrictive. Alternatively, if we consider a pollution function with fixed
coefficient as hJ = b1(vJ1 − vJE1 ), the neutrality holds in v1 but not v2.
7 Indeed, the emission function may differ among countries due to geographical or technological reasons.
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Let us consider the effect of the transfer of the primary factors of production on the total
amount of the global public bads. Without loss of generality, we consider a transfer from
country A to country B by dτ :
−dvA = dvB = dτ > 0.
Differentiating and stacking (15), we obtain the effects of the changes in the factor endowments














where hJv ≡ [∂hJ/∂v1, ∂hJ/∂v2] denotes the marginal emissions from an increase in factor
endowments. From the stability condition and the second-order condition, we can verify that
1−φgAB φ
gB




w/∆gJ > 0. Noting that hJ(vJP ) is assumed to be positively
homogeneous in vJP , we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If the factor endowments ratios, vJ2 /v
J
1 , between the two countries, are
identical at the initial equilibrium, the total quantity of public bads does not change before and
after the transfer.
Proposition 2 shows that Warr’s neutrality theorem does not hold when the factor endow-
ments ratios between the two countries are different. In (18), the term, hAv − hBv , corresponds
to the productivity differential in the literature of voluntary provision of public goods (e.g.
Ihori, 1996). Since the pollution-generating function is assumed to be quasi-convex, the trans-
fer of capital from a capital abundant country, for example, results in the reduction of the
total amount of global public bads.
Now we turn to the welfare effect. The change in revenue may be written as follows:
dRJ = −cgdz + wdvJ − cgwdgJ , (19)
where the first term of RHS represents the increased cost of global public bads, the second
term is an income effect due to the change in factor endowments, and the last term denotes
the cost of public input provision. Inserting (18) and −dvA = dvB = dτ into (19), we obtain

































In the RHSs of (20) and (21), the first terms, which have the exact opposite effect on income
in each country, reflect the change in the factor of production available in the private sector.
The second terms represent the worldwide effect of th re-allocation of resources, which have




The effects of the transfer on welfare depend on which term dominates. In some special
cases, either or both terms in the RHSs of (20) and (21) vanish. If the effects of the public
bads on production are the same between the two industries in the sense of ε ≡ ε1 = ε2, then
wz = − (ε/z)w holds. Therefore, we obtain,






In this situation, the amount of global public goods does not affect the relative factor price,
w2/w1. Furthermore, the primary factors of production available in the private sector do not
change. Thus, the transfer is either beneficial or harmful for both countries.
Second, if the factor endowment ratios between the two countries are identical, any infin-














Hence, the transfer is beneficial for one country but harmful for the other. In particular,
depending on the contents of the primary factors of production to be transferred, the transfer
may harm the welfare of the recipient country.
It should be noted that a paradoxical result can not be excluded as long as ε1 6= ε2. The


















From (22), it is shown that if (ε1 − ε2) /Λ > (<)0 is met, a transfer taking the form of the
v1(v2) harms the recipient country. For example, let v1 and v2 denote labor and capital,
respectively, and let ε1 and ε2 denote the negative effects on production in the agricultural
sector and the manufacturing sector, respectively. Suppose that the agricultural sector is
labor-intensive and is affected more by public bads than the manufacturing sector. In this
situation, a labor intensive transfer in the sense of cgw2/c
g
w1 > dτ2/dτ1 harms the recipient
country, while the donor country benefits.
Thus, the effects of the transfer on the welfare can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3. Supposing that both governments adopt the clean-up policy,






1 hold, then the level of welfare in each country does not
change,
(ii) If ε1 = ε2 and vA2 /v
A
1 6= vB2 /vB1 hold, then the Pareto-improving transfer of factor of
production is possible.
(iii) If ε1 6= ε2 holds, then the transfer paradox may occur.
Together with Proposition 2, Part (i) of Proposition 3 implies that Warr’s neutrality the-
orem is valid if the global public bads symmetrically affect the private sectors of each country
and if the factor endowment ratios are identical across countries. Part (ii) of the proposition
suggests that the transfer to be Pareto-improving is possible if the factor endowment ratio
is vastly different between the two countries. In sum, when the two countries are identical
in terms of their factor endowment ratios, the game-theoretic reaction effect dominates the
10See Appendix 5.2.
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welfare effects of the transfer. In contrast, when the harmful effects resulting from the global
public bads are identical across industries, the welfare implication is determined according to
the marginal emissions.
3.3 Different Policy Instruments
In our analysis so far, both countries attempt to mitigate the effects of the global public goods
using the same policy instrument. In the real world, however, governments adopt different
policy instruments. Developing countries may adopt the environmental conservation policy,
while developed countries, which have access to advanced technologies in environmental clean-
up, may choose to produce public inputs rather than resource conservation.
Our study considers a situation in which two countries adopt different policy instruments
in order to reduce global public bads. It is assumed that country A adopts the resource
conservation policy while country B produces public input. That is, country A and B’ s
revenue function can be written as (9) and (11), respectively. Non-cooperative equilibrium
can be characterized by
RAz
¡
P, hA + z−A, swh
A
¢




P, h(vB)− gB + z−B, vB − cgwgB
¢
− cg(w) = 0. (15’)
The slope of the optimal response function is given by (14) and (17). In what follows, we
consider the transfer of primary factors of production from country A to B. As mentioned
in section 2.1, changes in the primary factor of production in country A do not induce any
change in welfare and the amount of global public bads. Hence, we consider the change in
the factor endowments only in country B.
Differentiating the system consisting (9) and (11), we obtain the change in the total amount
of the public bads as follows:
dz =
1 + φhAB³











where 1 + φhAB = swwz/∆
hA > 0, 1 + φhAB φ
gB
A > 0 and ∆
gB < 0 follow from second-order and
stability conditions.11 From (23), we can summarize the effects of the changes in the factor
endowments on the amount of the global public bads:
Proposition 4. If the marginal emission by an increase in factor endowments, hBv , is suf-
ficiently small, then the amount of global public bads is decreased by the transfer from the
country adopting the resource conservation policy to the country adopting the environmental
clean-up policy.
The intuition of Proposition 4 is straightforward. To simplify the explanation, suppose
















dvB, is positive, then the amount of the global public bads is reduced by the
transfer.
We now turn to the welfare implications. Noting that dRA = RAz dz




B + dz−B) +RBv dv
B, and using (23), we obtain the welfare effects as follows:12
dRA =
RAz


































Considering (23), we can write (25) as dRA =
©




dz : in order to improve the
welfare of country A, it is necessary that the total amount of the global public goods is reduced.
In country B, the welfare effect is more complicated because of the reactive effects of country
A. In (26), the first term, which can be rewritten as RBz dz
A, represents country A’s reaction
arising from the change in the public bads emitted by country B. This term will be negative
if the transfer reduces the total amount of global public bads, and if the slope of the optimal
response function of country A is negative. The second term in (26), whose sign depends
on the marginal emission of pollution and the unit cost of the public inputs, represents the
effects of the change in factor endowments under the constant public bads. Pareto-improving
is possible when the unit cost of public inputs in country B, cg, is sufficiently small.13. Hence,
we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Suppose a transfer from a country adopting the environmental conservation
policy to one adopting a clean-up policy. The donor country benefits if the total amount of
global public bads are decreased, and the recipient country benefits if the unit cost of abatement
is sufficiently small.
Proposition 5 states the important factor of whether the transfer improves the welfare
in the sense of Pareto or not is the technology of the pollution abatement. For example, if
the negative effects of public bads on production in the private sector are the same between
the two industries, the transfer from country A to country B is Pareto-improving under the
condition of RBz h
B
































where ε = ε1 = ε2 and γ ≡ ε0z/ε.14 In (27) and (28), since φgBI = −φhAI = −(1−γ)/(1−γ−ε)
holds, 1+ (1− γ) / (1− ε− γ) > 0 follows from the stability conditions. Thus, recalling (24),
we can see that Pareto improvement is possible for dvB > 0 if the total amount of the global
public bads is reduced by an increase in the factor endowments in country B. Hence, we
obtain the following result:
12See Appendix 5.3.
13Noting that RBz = −cg holds in the equilibrium.
14See Appendix 5.4.
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Corollary 1. Suppose that the two countries adopt different environmental policies and that
the effects of public bads on production are identical across industries. (i) The transfer of
the primary factors of production affects the net revenue of both countries at the same rate:
dRA/RA = dRB/RB for dvB 6= 0. (ii) Assistance to the country adopting environmental
conservation improves both countries’ welfare if the initial abatement cost in the donor country






dvB > 0 relatively low.
In the corollary above, RBz h
B
v + w represents the marginal effect of an increase in factor
endowments on the GDP of country B. Since the change in factor endowments in the country
adopting environmental conservation policy does not affect the behavior of that country, the
welfare effects depend on the change in factor endowments in the country adopting a clean-up
policy.
One might think that the transfer analyzed here differs from a usual assistance for a
distributive purpose since this may mean the transfer from developing to developed countries.
However, many developed countries support measures for environmental conservation , such
as reforestation, in developing countries. Such activities may be interpreted as decreases in the
factor endowments available for productive use. Proposition 5 suggests that the assistance for
reforestation may be desirable in the sense of Pareto even if the developed country increases
gross emissions in exchange for the assistance.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied the welfare implications of international transfers in the presence of
global public bads. In particular, we considered a situation where governments adopt one
of two types of policy instruments, namely, environmental conservation or environmental
cleanup. Our results show that the welfare effects of assistance depend on the environmental
policy that yje government chooses to adopt. When both recipient and donor countries adopt
an environmental conservation policy, Shibata’s second neutrality theorem is valid. Still,
even with an environmental clean-up policy, we cannot exclude the possibility of paradoxical
results.
We have also considered a situation in which the two countries adopt different policy
instruments. In the real world, developing countries tend to adopt the conservation policy
while the developed countries adopt environmental cleanup. Our results suggest that the
transfer of factor of production from developing countries to the developed countries that
possess advanced clean-up technology could improve the welfare in the sense of Pareto. In
contrast, when the unit cost for environmental cleanup is extremely high, the transfer from
the developed country engaged in the cleanup policy to the developing country could result
in improved welfare under the certain conditions.
The determinants of the effects of the transfer on welfare consist of two parts. The first
is the technological aspects of the global public bads and their abatement. The second is
a game-theoretic reaction of the governments involved. Our results imply that the reaction
effects, which weaken the effectiveness of the transfer, dominate the whole effect when the
two countries are similar in factor endowment ratios and adopted policy instruments. In
this sense, environmental cooperation, including assistance and transfer, should be pursued
between developed and developing countries, rather than solely among developed countries.
In this paper, we concentrated our attention on the small countries facing a fixed com-
modity price. Our result should ought not vary in a consideration of large countries, as long
13
as the marginal propensities to consume are the same in the two countries. However, if the
household preference vary widely, the terms of trade effects will play a significant role.
5 Appendices
5.1 Derivation of (18), (20) and (21)
In a clean-up policy, the initial equilibrium can be characterized by (15). Differentiating and
stacking (15), we obtain
Φgdg = Γgdv, (A1)
where dg = [dgA, dgB]T , dv = [dvA, dvB]T ,
Φg ≡
∙
∆gA ∆gA − cgwwz





















and ∆gJ is defined by (16). Since hJv and wz are two dimensional row vectors, Γ
g is a 2-by-4








where φgJI is defined by (17). Solving (A1), we obtain, dg = [Φ
g]−1 Γgdv. After some manip-














































On the other hand, it is ambiguous whether an increase in the factor endowment in one






















































∆gA +∆gB − cgwwz
. (A6)
Inserting −dvA = dvB = dτ into (A6), we obtain (18).
5.2 Derivation of (22)
Recalling that the unit cost functions are homogeneous in w, and using (4), we can write the
difference in damages from the global public bads between the industries as follows:
ε1 − ε2 =
−zΛ
c1c2
(w2w1z − w1w2z) (A7)
where wiz ≡ ∂wi/∂z for i = 1, 2. Noting that the term, cgww, in (22) is a 2-by-2 matrix
and that cg = cgw1w1 + c
g
w2w2 follows from the homogeneity of the unit cost function, we can

























where the last equality is obtained by making use of (A7).
5.3 Derivation of (23), (25) and (26)
When the governments adopt policy instruments that differ from each other, the system can




































In the equations above, ∆hA and ∆gB are defined in (13) and (16), respectively. The de-
terminant of Φm must be positive due to the stability condition of the equilibrium and the
second-order conditions:
detΦm = ∆hA∆gB(1 + φhAB φ
gB
A ) > 0, (A10)
where φhAB and φ
gB








1 + φhAB φ
gB
A









Since zA = hA, the change in the public bads generated in country A can be written as follows:
dzA =
φhAB











In country B, because of dzB = hBv dv
B − dgB, we obtain
dzB =
1











Thus, for an infinitesimal increase in vB, the amount of the global public bads changes as
follows:
dz = dzA + dzB (A14)
=
1 + φhAB³
1 + φhAB φ
gB
A




Using (A9) and (A12), we obtain the effects of the transfer on welfare as (25) and (26).
5.4 Derivation of (27) and (28)
Suppose that the negative effects of public bads on production are the same in two private
sectors. That is, a1(z) = a2(z) and ε ≡ ε1 = ε2 hold. In this case, (4) can be simplified as














































= − 1− γ













= (1− γ − ε) ε
z2
RJ .
Using (A17) -(A20), we obtain (27) and (28).
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